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ARTICLES

Venture Capitalists and Closely Held
IPOs: Lessons for Family-Controlled
Firms
Joseph H. Astrachan, Daniel L. McConaughy
This study examines how the presence of venture capitalists (VCs) in closely held IPOs relates to
their performance. It also identifies other factors that are related to the performance of closely held
IPOs. Closely held firms in this study had an average of 88% insider ownership before the IPO. In
general, we find that closely held IPOs benefit from associations with VCs. This finding suggests
that VCs’ outside expertise and connections are valuable assets. Because it takes time for VCs to
effect changes and because beneficial changes generally occur gradually, firms contemplating IPOs
must plan well in advance to maximize firm value. Family-controlled firms contemplating growth
or liquidity options through the IPO, VCs, or other outside capital should consider the findings of
this study because it identifies factors that are associated with more successful IPO outcomes.

Introduction
This study examines how the presence of venture capitalists in closely held IPOs relates to their
performance. Closely held firms in this study
are those that had above-the-sample-median insider ownership before the IPO. Insider ownership is the percentage holdings of officers and
directors as reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission. These firms had an average of 88% insider ownership before the IPO.
The study also identifies other factors that are
related to the performance of closely held IPOs.
Family-controlled firms contemplating
growth or liquidity options through the IPO,
venture capitalists (VCs), or other outside
capital should consider this study because it identifies factors that are associated with more successful outcomes. Shanker and Astrachan (1996)
estimate that 61% of closely held firms are family controlled. Thus, the experiences of closely
held firms should be relevant to the managers
and owners of family-controlled firms who are
at the juncture of deciding on how to finance the
next step in their firms’ growth.

In general, we find that closely held IPOs
benefit from associations with VCs. This finding suggests that outside expertise is beneficial.
Another implication is that these events must be
planned for well in advance to maximize firm
value because beneficial changes generally occur
gradually.
To understand better the significance of
studying closely held companies and the impact
of venture capital, we review the theoretical and
empirical studies related to the subject at hand.
The remainder of this section looks at the relevant literature.
Because of the incentives it provides, insider
ownership often is thought to be related to company performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
show that the higher the level of insider ownership, the more valuable the firm because of the
incentives provided by ownership. However,
Stulz (1988) suggests that insider ownership over
50% may lead to entrenchment and, thus, a lower
value. Morck, Schleifer, and Vishney (1988) find
evidence to support Jensen and Meckling (1976),
whereas McConnell and Servaes (1990) lend
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empirical support to Stulz (1988). These studies
are consistent with the notion that insider ownership provides incentives that are related to value
and performance.
The insider ownership of a firm also may
provide information about the firm’s quality. Insiders, who have better information than outside
investors, are more willing to hold shares if they
expect the company to have good future prospects. Leyland and Pyle (1977) suggest this in
the sense that the level of insider ownership will
provide a signal of quality and mitigate information asymmetries. They provide a model showing that others are more willing to invest in a
venture where the insiders own more. Downes
and Heinkel (1982) provide supporting evidence
by observing that firms where insiders retain
greater ownership after the IPO are more valuable at their IPOs.
Similarly, the presence of venture capital investors in a firm may provide a signal of quality.
VCs are sophisticated and well-informed investors; so the fact that they have made investments
in a company serves to certify company quality,
much like bank loans are a signal of quality because of the due diligence analysis a bank undertakes before lending (James, 1987). Further,
VCs often provide managerial and strategic expertise, which adds value to the firms in which
they invest.
Megginson and Weiss (1991) examined IPOs
over the 1983 to 1987 time period. They present
evidence consistent with the notion that VCs play
a certification role in IPOs. They find that VCbacked IPOs had lower spreads and initial returns. In other words, VCs lower the costs of
going public and increase the proceeds to the
offering firm. Likewise, Brav and Gompers
(1997) find that VC-backed IPOs over the 1972
to 1992 period outperformed non-VC-backed
IPOs on an equally weighted returns basis.
Closely held firms are less likely to have professional management because with such a large
stake, the founding family or owner group is likely
to be quite active in the company. Thus, VCs
may play an important and beneficial role in these
firms.
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This study looks at the characteristics and
performance of closely held IPOs vis-à-vis those
not closely held, as well as the relation of VCs to
these variables. In this study, the insiders in
closely held IPOs held a mean of 88.3% (median
of 89.3%) of the shares before the IPO compared
to a mean insider ownership of 40.3% (median
of 43.4%) in nonclosely held firms. It examines
IPOs that occurred over the period of 1970 to
1998 for which there were insider ownership
data.1 We find that closely held IPO firms had
higher ROA (return on assets) and debt-to-assets and lower profit margins before the IPO and
that they were valued lower at the IPO in terms
of market-to-book and pro forma price-to-earnings but higher on the basis of price-to-sales.
We also observe that the percent owned after the IPO is positively related to pro forma
ROE (return on equity), price-to-earnings, and
market-to-book. We also observe that the presence of VCs is generally positively related to performance and value and negatively related to
gross underwriting spread. Our results suggest
that well before the IPO, closely held firms
should work with VCs or others who can provide expertise and strategic guidance in helping
them harvest the fruits of their labors through
an IPO.

IPO Sample and Data
This study looks at IPOs over the 1970 to 1998
time period. The sample includes IPOs for which
ownership data are available. This study focuses
on IPOs that are closely held because of the powerful roles that insider owners play. For the purpose of this study, we define closely held IPOs as
those that have above-sample-median insider
ownership prior to the IPO. Because ownership
data are lacking almost completely for the earliest years, most of the sample dates from the late
1980s.
To get a broad view of the performance of
IPOs in the sample, and specifically closely held
1

There were approximately 10,000 IPOs in the sample, but
many had missing data. Most of the sample IPOs occurred
since the late 1980s.
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IPOs and the role of VCs, we examine the offering characteristics of the IPO firms, the insider
ownership characteristics, firm characteristics
both before and after the IPO, and stock market
performance. We also employ some of these
characteristics as control variables to ascertain the
special characteristics of closely held IPOs and
the role of VCs.
Below, we provide a list of the data used and
their descriptions.
Offering characteristics:
• Venture backed. A dummy variable taking
the value of 1 when VCs were involved, 0
otherwise. VC-backed firms may be
higher quality due to the certification that
comes from having informed investors.
• % shares offered by overallotment option. The
percent of shares sold through the
overallotment option as a percent of total
shares sold. The overallotment option (i.e.,
the Green Shoe Option) is a common feature in IPOs. It allows the underwriter to
sell more shares at the market price and
yet pay the issuing firm the offering price.
If the issue does well, the overallotment
option is exercised. It indicates quality in
that it signals to the market that the underwriters have an incentive to price the
issue to do well so that they can sell
overallotment shares into the market and
make a profit, possibly a large profit.
• % spread. Calculated as the ratio of the
underwriter discount as a percent of total
offering amount before payouts. The
percentage spread is a measure of the total direct costs of going public. Generally, due to the many fixed costs associated with going public, the percentage
spread is higher for smaller issues. Lower
spreads, other things being equal, indicate that the proceeds go to the company.
• Offers syndicated. A variable that takes the
value of 1 when the IPO was underwritten by a syndicate of underwriters, 0 otherwise.
• Lockup duration. The number of days that
insiders’ shares are restricted. Longer

lockups may indicate a higher quality issue because the insiders are bonded to the
firm more closely.
• Lockup. A dummy variable taking the value
of 1 when there was a lockup of insider
shares, 0 otherwise.
• Proceeds. The amount of money that went
to the company after the underwriter’s discount. This is reported in millions of
dollars.
Ownership characteristics:
• % own after. The percentage of insider
ownership after the IPO. Higher quality
IPOs would be expected to have higher
values.
• % own before. The percentage of insider
ownership before the IPO.
• Closely held IPO. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm’s insider
ownership was above the sample median,
0 otherwise.
• % holdings divested. The percentage of insider shares sold as a proportion of those
held before the IPO. It would be expected
that higher quality companies would have
lower rates of divesture because there is
less risk for the insiders.
Company characteristics:
• Sales. Reported in millions of dollars as
reported for the year before the IPO. Size
is an important measure due to scale and
scope effects as well as being a measure of
success. It is an important control variable.
• Debt-to-assets. Total debt-to-total assets at
the time just before the IPO. High levels
may indicate that the firm is capital constrained and must go to the equity market to get funds.
• Price-to-earnings. Calculated as IPO priceto-earnings the year before the IPO. It is
a measure of relative value and may be
related to quality.
• Price-to-sales. Calculated as IPO price-tosales the year before the IPO. It is a mea297
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•
•

•

•

sure of relative value and may be related
to quality.
Profit margin. Net income as a percent of
sales the year before the IPO.
Total asset turnover. Calculated as sales divided by assets. It is a measure of asset use
efficiency. Generally, higher turnover ratios, other things being equal, are better.
ROA. Return on assets in percent before
the IPO. Higher values indicate a higher
quality company. The DuPont Identity2
shows that ROA is the product of profit
margin and total asset turnover. Therefore, it is the interaction of the two factors.
ROE. The return on pro forma book
equity. Higher values indicate a higher
quality company. The DuPont Identity
shows that ROE is the product of ROA
and leverage as expressed by total assetsto-total equity. Therefore, it shows the
impact of leverage on profitability to
shareholders.

Stock market performance:
• Stock market returns. Expressed in percent
for the time periods indicated.
• NASDAQ-adjusted stock returns. Calculated as the difference between the
company’s return over the specified time
period less the return on the NASDAQ
stock market index over the same time
period. This gives a relative, market-adjusted performance measure that will
show the firm’s own returns in a more
meaningful context.
• Priced above high. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the IPO price was
above the high end of the range in the prospectus, 0 otherwise. Offers that are priced
above the high end of the range are ones
where demand was greater. Thus, this variable is an indicator of company quality.
2

The DuPont Identity is: return on equity, which is (net
income/equity) = (net income/sales) x (sales/assets) x (assets/
equity). Note that (net income/sales) x (sales/assets) = (net
income/assets), which is return on assets.
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• Priced below low. A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the IPO price
was below the low end of the range in
the prospectus, 0 otherwise. Offers that
are priced below the low end of the range
are ones where demand was low. Thus,
this variable is an indicator of company
quality.
• Market-to-book equity. Calculated as IPO
market value of equity to pro forma book
equity at the IPO. It is a measure of relative value. Higher quality firms or those
with more growth opportunities are expected to have higher values.
Types of Analysis. We employ both univariate and multivariate analyses. Because closely held
firms are generally smaller and may differ systematically from nonclosely held firms, a multivariate
analysis provides a clearer profile of closely held
firms versus their more diffusely held counterparts.
The analyses are in terms of event time. In other
words, for each IPO issue, the zero time is the
IPO date.

Closely held vs. Nonclosely held
IPOs
This section discusses the empirical results of the
study. First, we present the descriptive statistics
that compare closely held with nonclosely held
IPOs. Then we employ multivariate analyses to
examine more closely the differences between
closely held and nonclosely held IPOs. Multivariate analyses control for a variety of factors so
that the distinctive characteristics of the closely
held IPOs and the roles of VCs are profiled. Finally, we examine the closely held IPOs with the
same type of multivariate analysis to determine
which characteristics add value to these firms.
Descriptive Statistics. Closely held and
nonclosely held IPOs do not differ significantly
with respect to two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Code) industry concentrations. This means
that when making comparisons, any differences
observed should not be based on industry factors. Statistical tests indicated that there are no
differences in the distributions of the two-digit
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Table 1. Univariate Analysis of Sample Characteristics:
Closely Held vs. Nonclosely Held IPOs
(p-values based on two-tailed tests)
Panel A: Size Characteristics of Firms Prior to IPO ($ millions)
Sales Before IPO

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
34.8
Mean
83.4
p<
.09
n
979
p-values are based on two-tailed tests of sample mean differences.

37.6
105.7

Assets Before IPO

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

15.7
76.4
.16
1,408

15.6
200.1

Net Income Before IPO

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

2.2
4.7
.01
995

2.5
7.8

Proceeds ($ millions)

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

24.0
45.2
.59
1,477

25.0
42.7
1,474

% of Shares Offered by Overallotment Option

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

1.3
3.7
.34
981

1.4
3.0

% Priced Above High End of Range

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Mean
p<
n

19.5
.26
1,477

21.2
1,474

% Priced Below Low End of Range

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Mean
p<
n

25
.59
1,477

26

712

1,419

727

Panel B: Offering Characteristics

941

1,474
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Table 1. Univariate Analysis of Sample Characteristics, continued
% Offers Syndicated

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Mean
p<
n

81
.87
1,477

81
1,474

% Offers Venture-Capital Backed

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Mean
p<
n

24.5
.000
1,477

41.5
1,474

% Offers with Lockup

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Mean
p<
n

92.0
.05
1,477

93.9
1,474

Duration of Lockup (days)

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

180
276
.000
1,355

180
245

% Underwriters’ Spread

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

7.00
7.76
.000
1476

7.00
7.53
1474

% Owned Before Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

89.3
88.3
.000
1,477

43.4
40.3
1,474

% Owned after Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

58.7
57.1
.000
1,477

28.7
27.7
1,474

% Holdings Divested

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

32.4
34.7
.000
1,477

28.8
29.0

1,382

Panel C: Insider Shareholdings
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Table 1. Univariate Analysis of Sample Characteristics, continued
Panel D: Firm Characteristics Prior to Offer
% Profit Margin Before Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

6.16
8.66
.01
991

6.53
9.95

Total Asset Turnover Before Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

1.77
2.11
.000
955

1.44
1.56

725

702

% Return on Assets Before Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

9.72
22.8
.000
969

7.65
17.9

Debt-to-Assets Before Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

0.168
0.247
.002
948

0.120
0.221

% Return on Equity after Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

10.25
14.15
.000
995

8.69
13.18

Market-to-Book Equity after Offer

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

3.46
5.93
.001
1,464

3.08
6.20

718

945

Panel E: Firm Characteristics after Offer

727

1,449

Price-to-Earnings Pro Forma

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

25.0
53.4
.38
884

26.7
66.6
655
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Table 1. Univariate Analysis of Sample Characteristics, continued
Price to Sales

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
2.21
1.59
Mean
15.44
8.18
p<
.13
n
978
711
p-values calculated using the Mann-Whitney U-test statistic for firm characteristics ratios.
Panel F: Stock Market Performance
% First-Day Return

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

9.13
16.73
.11
701

8.33
14.97

% Two-Week Return

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

11.46
19.77
.97
1,257

11.25
19.80

% Return One Year

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

42.5
63.4
.54
894

40.0
61.0

% Return Two Weeks, NASDAQ Adjusted

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

9.33
17.19
.97
1,257

9.02
17.16

665

1,254

916

1,254

% Return One Year, NASDAQ Adjusted

Closely Held

Nonclosely Held

Median
Mean
p<
n

24.17
43.89
.57
892

21.12
41.75

SICs for the two groups.
Table 1, Panel A, shows that closely held
IPOs are smaller than nonclosely held IPOs. The
average closely held IPO had average sales, assets, and net income (in millions) of $83.4, $76.4
and $4.7, respectively, compared to $105.7,
$200.1, and $7.8, respectively, for the average
nonclosely held IPO. The mean and median
302
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values differ quite a lot, especially for the
nonclosely held firms, suggesting that there were
some quite large nonclosely held IPOs that
tended to skew the statistics.3 However, the ob3

To deal with this, we use nonparametric tests of differences,
where appropriate. These types of tests focus more on the
median of the sample rather than the mean. Also, in the
regression analyses, we utilize logarithmic transformations
to deal with this problem.
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servation still holds that the average nonclosely
held IPO firm was larger than the average closely
held IPO firm.
The offering characteristics of the two
groups show some similarities and some differences. Panel B shows that the proceeds from the
IPO, percent shares offered by the overallotment
option, percent priced above or below the expected price range, and the percent of offers syndicated are not statistically significantly different from each other. However, the percent of
offers that are venture capital backed are significantly higher for the nonclosely held firms:
41.5% vs. 24.5%. This finding may be due to
insiders owning more of the stock and, therefore, having less need for venture capital infusions. Closely held firms’ IPOs also had longer
share lockups and wider spreads.
Panel C shows that insiders’ holdings in
closely held IPOs were higher both before and
after the IPO than nonclosely held IPOs: 88.3%
and 57.1%, respectively, compared to 40.3% and
27.7%, respectively. We also note that the percentage of holdings divested through the IPO is
higher for the closely held IPOs: 34.7% vs.
29.0%. However, note that a characteristic of
closely held businesses is that the insiders still
retain majority control after the IPO. This fact
may help explain why they are more efficient.
Closely held businesses appear to be more
efficient before the IPO. Panel D shows that
closely held firms had higher average returns on
assets: 22.8% vs.17.9%. They achieved this
through much higher turnovers (2.11 vs. 1.56),
even though profit margins were somewhat lower
(8.66% vs. 9.95%). These results suggest that
the closely held firms tended to rely more on
operating efficiency than pricing power.
Leverage differences exist between closely
held and nonclosely held firms. Interestingly
enough, closely held firms carry more debt before the IPO than do the nonclosely held firms.
Closely held firms’ total debt-to-total assets averaged 0.247, compared to 0.221 for nonclosely
held firms. This observation suggests that one
reason closely held firms go public is that they
have maximized their use of debt capital and are

forced to go to the market to raise equity capital.
Closely held firms also differ from nonclosely
held firms after the public offering. Panel E shows
that closely held firms have higher ROE, market-to-book equity, and price-to-sales.4 There is
little difference in the P/E (price-to-earnings)
ratios. Likewise, McConaughy (1994) finds that
closely held controlled firms had much higher
market-to-book ratios but were not different with
respect to P/Es when compared to nonclosely
held controlled firms.
Please note that very few IPO firms paid dividends: 1.8% of the closely held firms and 1.2%
of the nonclosely held firms paid dividends.
Given the small sample of firms that paid dividends, trying to make a statistical distinction between the dividend yields is not recommended
and we did not, therefore, include it in the tables.
With regard to stock market performance, Panel
F shows that closely held firms earn higher returns on the first day and over the first year than
nonclosely held firms. Given the relatively small
performance differential (about 2%) and the
many factors that affect returns, we will return
to this later.
Analysis of Factors Associated with Sample
Characteristics. Univariate comparisons may not
reliably indicate differences between closely held
and nonclosely held IPOs if other factors associated with closely held control are related to the
variable of interest. For instance, closely held
firms are smaller and have higher underwriting
spreads. Because spreads are wider for smaller
issues, closely held firms may have higher spreads
due to their size and not to the fact that they are
closely held. Controlling for multiple variables
simultaneously with closely held control allows
us to determine more reliably whether closely
held IPOs differ from nonclosely held IPOs.
Table 2, Panel A presents details regarding
some of the offering characteristics. For example,
4

Closely held firms’ mean market-to-book equity was lower,
but their median value was higher, indicating that the data
are skewed and that median values are better descriptors of
the central tendency. The nonparametric Mann-Whitney
U-test finds that closely held IPO firms have significantly
higher market-to-book ratios than do nonclosely held IPOs.

303

Astrachan, McConaughy
closely held does not relate to the proportion of
IPOs priced above or below the offering range
or to the number having lockups. Interestingly
enough, we observe that venture-backed firms
are more likely to be priced above the range and
less likely to be priced below the expected price
range. We also observe that larger firms are more
likely to have a lockup provision and that venture-backed firms are less likely to have a lockup.
Because venture investors are interested in harvesting their investment, it is not surprising to
see that venture-backed firms are less likely to
have a lockup.
Panel B looks at insider ownership after the
IPO, whether the IPO is venture backed, proceeds, and sales to determine whether closely held
IPOs differ from nonclosely held IPOs with respect to lockup duration, percentage spread, and
the percentage of shares offered through the
overallotment option. We find that the lockup
duration, percentage spread, and percentage
shares offered through the overallotment option
are all positively related to being closely held.
When closely held firms go public, outsiders may
question why controlling insiders want to share
the wealth; so a longer lockup may be needed to
assure the market of the quality of the firm and
the commitment of the insiders to run the firm
efficiently. It is also interesting to note that firms
that have greater insider ownership after the IPO
are venture backed, and those that are larger, have
shorter lockup periods.
After controlling for relevant factors, closely
held IPOs have only a slightly higher spread.
Because they are less likely to be venture backed,
it may suggest that underwriters experience extra costs and difficulties while working with the
controlling insiders, who may have less professional managerial experience or less experience
working with outside investors or the capital
markets.
The overallotment option can be viewed as
a signal of quality, given that the underwriters
cannot exercise it unless the issue remains above
the offer price so that exercising the option has
value. The overallotment option is like a call
option with a strike price equal to the issue price.
304

Underwriters will make more exercising the
overallotment option the better the issue does in
the aftermarket. The fact that closely held IPOs
issue more through the overallotment option
than nonclosely held firms may be due to the fact
that the issues experience higher returns. It may
be that closely held firms use the overallotment
option as a way to reassure investors that the issue is a quality one and that the closely held firm
will wait until the issue begins to trade and sell
more only if it does well. Because we do not have
the data to tell us how many firms had overallotment
options that were not exercised, we cannot say
whether the option is more frequent among closely
held controlled firms. It is possible to observe only
that more shares are sold this way.
Panel C shows that, as expected, closely held
IPOs have more concentrated insider ownership
both before and after the IPO, even after controlling for firm size, profitability (ROA), and
venture backed. The percentage owned before
is negatively related to venture backed, but not
to sales or profitability. However, the percentage owned after is positively related to profitability and size, but not venture backed. This
finding suggests that insiders are more likely to
hold onto more profitable firms—which is not
surprising.
Size may be related to quality and, therefore,
insiders are more likely to hold onto shares after
the IPO. Likewise, the percentage of holdings
divested is negatively related to size (sales), profitability (ROA), and venture backed. In other
words, insiders may be more willing to retain
shares in larger (perhaps less risky) and more
profitable firms. Likewise, the presence of VCs
and their expertise may reduce the risk associated with insider share holdings.
Panel D reinforces what we observed in the
univariate statistics—that closely held firms had
lower margins, higher turnover, and higher ROA
than nonclosely held firms. However, after controlling for venture backed and size, closely held
firms’ leverage ratios are not significantly different from those of nonclosely held firms. Given
that one might expect closely held firms to have
less debt, the fact that they even have about the
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Table 2. Analysis of Factors Associated with Sample Characteristics
Panel A: Offering Characteristics
Priced Above
High

Priced Below
Low

Lockup

Constant

-0.976 (.000)

-0.625 (.000)

1.289(.000)

-0.170(.111)

Closely held

—

—

—

-0.593(.000)

Venture backed

0.146 (.05)

-0.096 (.07)

-0.261(.000)

Sales

0.036 (.57)

—

0.294(.001)

0.002(.972)

n

1691

2951

1691

1691

Chi-sq. p-value

.12

.07

.000

.000

Venture Backed

Binomial probit analysis of the dependent variables Priced Above High, Priced Below Low, Lockup, Closely Held
IPO, and Venture Backed, which are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the condition holds, 0
otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of sales in $ millions. ‘—’ indicates that inclusion of variable reduces chi-sq.
statistic. P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

Panel B: Offering Characteristics
Lockup Duration
(days)

% Spread

Constant

435.24 (.000)

9.19 (.000)

0.133 (.000)

Closely held

55.29 (.000)

0.111 (.115)

0.032 (.032)

% owned after

-1.13 (.000)

0.005 (.003)

-0.001 (.032)

Venture backed

-63.23 (.000)

-0.377 (.000)

0.017 (.123)

% Shares Offered by
Overallotment Option

Proceeds ($ millions)

—

-0.012 (.579)

-0.047 (.000)

Sales

-101.2 (.000)

-1.236 (.000)

0.037 (.000)

1593

1691

1163

.21

.36

.096

n
2

Adjusted R

OLS regression analysis of the dependent variables Lockup Duration, % Spread and % Shares Offered by
Overallotment Option. Sales and Proceeds are the logarithm of those values. ‘—’ indicates that inclusion of
variable reduces Adjusted R2 statistic. P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

same level as nonclosely held firms also suggests
that the closely held firms may have extended
themselves on debt and, therefore, are going to
the capital markets to reduce their risk exposure.
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) show that even
very large family-controlled firms are more averse
to financial risk after controlling for factors that
are associated with risk. They suggest that it is
the risk of the loss of control through financial
distress that is important, given that business risk

was controlled for.
Panel E shows that closely held firms have
lower ROE (based on common equity immediately after the offering and the previous year’s
net income), pro forma P/E, and market-to-book
equity. The evidence from Table 1 may explain
this. The data show that the closely held firms
are smaller, yet the proceeds are similar. This
would increase the equity base more in closely
held firms and lower the ROE and market-to305
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Table 2. Analysis of Factors Associated with
Sample Characteristics, continued
Panel C: Insider Ownership Characteristics
% Owned Before

% Owned After

% Holdings Divested

Constant

41.05 (.000)

20.02 (.000)

0.413 (.000)

Closely held

49.09 (.000)

30.69 (.000)

0.042 (.000)

Venture backed

-2.77 (.058)

0.827 (.299)

-0.026 (.014)

Sales

-0.946 (.432)

2.06 (.002)

-0.047 (.000)

ROA

0.878 (.164)

2.18 (.000)

-0.17 (.000)

1634

1634

1634

.46

.53

.04

n
2

Adjusted R

OLS regression analysis of the dependent variables % Owned Before, % Owned After, and % Holdings Divested.
Closely Held, and Venture Backed are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the condition holds, 0
otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of sales. ROA is the logarithm of return on assets in percent before the IPO.
P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

Panel D: Firm Characteristics Prior to Offer
Total Asset
Profit Margin
Turnover

Return on
Assets

Total Debt-toTotal Assets

Constant

2.84 (.000)

-0.484 (.000)

2.356 (.000)

-2.158 (.000)

Closely held

-0.144 (.002)

0.423 (.000)

0.271 (.000)

0.027 (.729)

Venture backed

-0.195 (.000)

0.295 (.000)

0.112 (.051)

-0.622 (.000)

Sales

-0.571 (.000)

0.265 (.000)

-0.308 (.000)

0.115 (.087)

n

1691

1634

1634

1195

Adjusted R2

.12

.07

.04

.05

OLS regression analysis of the dependent variables Profit Margin, Total Asset Turnover, Return on Assets, and
Total Debt-to-Total Assets. They are calculated as the logarithms of those values. Closely Held and Venture
Backed are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the condition holds, 0 otherwise. Sales is the logarithm
of sales. P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

book equity. Although closely held control is
associated with higher price-to-sales when sales
are not controlled for, the impact is quite small
and very little of the variation in price-to-sales is
explained without including sales. When sales is
included, no other factors show up as being significant. The results in this panel show that larger
firms sell at lower multiples.
That the P/E is lower for closely held firms
may be explained by the fact that they are more
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profitable (ROA) and, therefore, have more earnings, lowering the ratio. This profitability may
explain the lower market-to-book equity at the
offering because more profitable firms, if they
retain earnings, will have more book equity, lowering market-to-book.
Panel F shows that VCs are associated with
more successful IPOs VCs not only choose in
which firms they invest, they also can influence
the outcome by virtue of their board seats. This
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Table 2. Analysis of Factors Associated with
Sample Characteristics, continued
Panel E: Firm Characteristics after Offer
Price-to-Earnings
Return on Equity
Pro Forma

Price to Sales

Market-to-Book
Equity

Constant

1.117 (.000)

3.523 (.000)

4.338 (.000)

1.181 (.000)

Closely held

-0.223 (.000)

-0.220 (.002)

0.065 (.474)

-0.152 (.011)

Venture backed

-0.058 (.359)

0.332 (.000)

-.031 (.651)

-0.026 (.557)

Sales

0.510 (.000)

-0.247 (.000)

-2.274 (.000)

-0.389 (.000)

% owned after

0.007 (.000)

0.006 (.000)

-0.002 (.275)

0.013 (.000)

n

1691

1433

1689

1691

.13

.06

.50

.12

2

Adjusted R

OLS regression analysis of the dependent variables Return on Equity, Price to Earnings, Price to Sales, and
Market-to-Book Equity. They are calculated as the logarithms of those values. Closely Held and Venture Backed
are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the condition holds, 0 otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of
sales. P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

Panel F: Stock Market Performance

1-Day
Return

2-Week
Return

1-Year
Return

2-Week
Return,
NASDAQ
Adjusted

1-Year
Return,
NASDAQ
Adjusted

Constant

14.83 (.000)

16.37 (.000)

42.62 (.000)

3.10 (.000)

26.08 (.016)

Closely held

-3.17 (.101)

-7.07 (.000)

-14.66 (.041)

-0.10 (.702)

-10.77 (.127)

Sales

-4.71 (.000)

-4.79 (.000)

-9.32 (.050)

0.011 (.947)

-8.89 (.058)

Venture backed

4.04 (.004)

6.98 (.000)

22.63 (.000)

-0.404 (.037)

22.76 (.000)

% owned after

0.124 (.007)

0.221 (.000)

0.59 (.000)

0.002 (.767)

0.48 (.003)

ROA

1.28 (.036)

1.18 (.039)

5.47 (.019)

-0.24 (.004)

5.30 (.021)

n

801

1506

1123

1631

1121

.04

.06

.04

.01

.04

2

Adjusted R

OLS regression analysis of the dependent variables associated with stock returns as indicated above. Returns
are expressed in percent. Closely Held and Venture Backed are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the
condition holds, 0 otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of sales. ROA is the logarithm of return on assets in
percent before the IPO. P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

panel also shows that firms that are more productive, as measured by ROA, do better in the
aftermarket.
Factors Associated with the Performance of
Closely Held IPOs. The above analysis shows

that closely held IPOs differ from those that are
not. Market performance and value are always
major concerns of any company going public and
perhaps more so when they are closely held due
to the large, undiversified financial stakes of the
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Table 3. Factors Associated with the Performance of Closely Held IPOs
Panel A: Stock Market Performance

1-Day
Return
Constant

10.98 (.010)

2-Week
Return

1-Year
Return

2-Week
Return,
NASDAQ
Adjusted

1-Year
Return,
NASDAQ
Adjusted

12.31 (.002)

17.67 (.281)

9.06 (.023)

8.99 (.580)

Sales

0.80 (.647)

-0.263 (.877)

-3.60 (.615)

-0.194 (.910)

-4.29 (.545)

Venture backed

1.50 (.413)

3.62 (.047)

20.19 (.005)

3.90 (.033)

20.65 (.004)

% owned after

.012 (.038)

0.195 (.000)

0.813 (.000)

0.194 (.000)

0.676 (.002)

ROA

4.58 (.000)

5.09 (.000)

7.77 (.039)

5.25 (.000)

7.38 (.048)

ROE

-6.23 (.000)

-7.27 (.000)

-7.04 (.151)

-7.16 (.000)

-7.092 (.145)

478

864

631

864

629

.076

.073

.037

.073

.031

n
2

Adjusted R

Returns are expressed in percent. Closely Held and Venture Backed are dummy variables taking the value of 1
when the condition holds, 0 otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of sales. ROA is the logarithm of return on
assets in percent before the IPO. ROE is the logarithm of return on pro-forma book equity. P-values are in
parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

Panel B: Stock Market Performance of Closely Held Firms with a Lockup Greater than or Equal
to 180 Days
2-Week
1-Year
Return,
Return,
1-Day
2-Week
1-Year
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
Return
Return
Return
Adjusted
Adjusted
Constant

0.635 (.915)

2.10 (.715)

46.41 (.060)

-1.42 (.807)

37.63 (.123)

Sales

3.94 (.052)

1.50 (.463)

-11.63 (.184)

1.621 (.432)

-11.81 (.173)

Venture backed

2.13 (.270)

4.96 (.012)

15.07 (.060)

5.265 (.008)

14.89 (.060)

% owned after

0.121 (.057)

0.23 (.000)

0.817 (.002)

0.227 (.000)

0.668 (.012)

ROA

6.43 (.000)

6.23 (.000)

7.932 (.075)

6.34 (.000)

8.05 (.068)

ROE

-7.43 (.000)

-7.96 (.000)

-7.273 (.187)

-7.86 (.000)

-7.782 (.154)

Lockup duration

0.015 (.044)

0.02 (.022)

-0.059 (.045)

0.018 (.013)

-0.059 (.043)

n

434

775

560

775

558

Adjusted R2

.11

.09

.04

.09

.04

Returns are expressed in percent. Closely Held and Venture Backed are dummy variables taking the value of 1
when the condition holds, 0 otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of sales. ROA is the logarithm of return on
assets in percent before the IPO. ROE is the logarithm of return on pro-forma book equity. Lockup Duration is
measured in days. P-values are in parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 3. Factors Associated with the Performance of
Closely Held IPOs, continued
Panel C: Price Multiples
Price-to-Earnings
Pro Forma
Constant

3.73 (.000)

Sales

-0.303 (.000)

% owned after

Price-to-Sales

Market-to-Book
Equity

1.448 (.000)

0.861 (.000)

0.008 (.000)

-0.022 (.000)

0.012 (.000)

ROA

-0.224 (.000)

0.182 (.000)

0.093 (.001)

Venture backed

0.390 (.000)

0.103 (.471)

-0.053 (.421)

n

801

942

943

Adjusted R2

.12

.04

.11

-0.384 (.000)

OLS regression analysis of the dependent variables Price to Earnings, Price to Sales, and Market-to-Book Equity.
They are calculated as the logarithms of those values. Closely Held and Venture Backed are dummy variables
taking the value of 1 when the condition holds, 0 otherwise. Sales is the logarithm of sales. P-values are in
parentheses and based on two-tailed tests.

insiders. Thus, an examination of the market performance and valuation of these firms may provide insights and guidance for those who contemplate going public. We do this by examining
the closely held firms in the sample.
Table 3, Panel A, examines the stock market
performance of closely held IPOs and shows
which factors contribute to higher performance.
With respect to venture capital involvement,
there is no impact on the first day’s returns, but
the impact of venture capital involvement increases over time. This interesting observation
suggests that initial investors do not fully anticipate all of the future benefits of VC involvement
and that the benefits continue to accrue after the
IPO. VCs provide not only capital, but also
managerial expertise, sit on the board, and often
are experienced in dealing with the outside capital markets. The results here suggest that the
involvement of VCs in the firm have benefits that
do not cease after the IPO. Closely held firms
without this kind of expertise may not do as well
when they go public because they are not used
to the scrutiny of the outside investors.
Another factor that positively impacts the

stock market performance of closely held firms
is a higher level of insider ownership. Because it
is expected that insiders of higher quality firms
would hold onto their shares, their ownership
level sends a signal to the capital markets regarding the quality of the firm’s future prospects. It
also signals the commitment of management
given that insider share holdings often are restricted and provide incentives for managers to
maximize firm value.
ROA also is positively related to stock market performance. Apparently, the quality of earnings is not fully priced at the offering, and quality earnings continue to please investors. That
ROE is negatively related to performance, after
controlling for ROA, suggests that higher leverage interacts with profitability to have a negative
impact on share performance.5 This suggests that
the IPOs of overleveraged firms are not as successful because the IPO may be a remedy to
overleveraging—that is, to pay down debt—
rather than a means to acquire growth capital.
5

ROE = ROA x (assets/equity), where (assets/equity) is a
measure of leverage, the equity multiplier.
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Lockup requirements are a way of bonding
insiders to the firm by restricting their ability to
sell shares. Lockups of 180 days are most common; so we eliminated those with lockups of less
than 180 days and reran the analyses in Panel A.
Most of these firms had zero lockup periods. The
effect of this is to examine whether increasing
the lockup beyond the typical 180 days was associated with any difference in performance.
Panel C shows that larger closely held firms
sell at lower multiples, whereas in Panel A, size
had no relation to returns. The level of insider
ownership had an economically small, but statistically significant, impact on price multiples.
ROA was positively related to price-to-sales and
market-to-book equity, but negatively related to
P/E. The negative relation was discussed above,
where more profitability would translate into
lower P/Es because of larger denominators (Es).
Venture capital involvement positively impacted
the P/Es at which closely held firms sold. Venture Capital involvement was unrelated to priceto-sales and market-to-book equity.

Conclusion
Our results support Stulz’s (1988) notion that
closely held IPOs do not perform as well in the
stock market in spite of their higher ROA before
the IPO. This may reflect market concerns regarding insider entrenchment, given that the
market for corporate control is ineffective in firms
where insiders holding a majority of the shares
have control. Our finding that the percentage
owned after the IPO is positively related to value
and stock market performance is consistent with
the signaling hypothesis of Leyland and Pyle
(1977). Further, the positive impact of VCs on
performance and value is consistent with Brav
and Gompers (1997) and Megginson and Weiss
(1991), who hypothesize that VCs provide a certification of quality.
Closely held firms would do well to consider
getting VCs involved well in advance of a contemplated public offering. Although closely held
firms tend to have higher ROA and asset turnover, they do not sell at a premium and their stock
310

returns are lower than those that are not as closely
held. However, the impact of VCs can serve to
increase the value of the firm. Their contributions come in the form of experience with grooming the firm for sale as well as reducing the holdings of the insiders, making them more accountable to investors.
The results of this study have implications
for family-controlled firms, a not insignificant
group of firms that is not addressed by any IPO
study. The main reason for this is that the determination of family control in IPOs is difficult,
time consuming, and somewhat subjective. [Objective measures, such as the ones McConaughy,
Walker, Henderson, and Mishra (1998) and
McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) used,
tend to be incomplete and biased against finding
results because not all family-controlled firms are
identified. The bias against finding results, however, strengthens any significant finding.] Related to the issue of closely held IPOs, Shanker
and Astrachan (1996) estimate that about 61%
of closely held corporations are family controlled.
Thus, closely held IPOs may proxy for family
control, making the results relevant to familycontrolled firms.
One main issue of family-controlled firms is
that of liquidity. Liquidity needs among familycontrolled firms extend beyond the need for
growth capital. These firms also deal with the
liquidity needs of senior generations to “cash out”
or the needs associated with estate taxes. Family-controlled firms with multiple generations of
family members also face the problem that some
other family members may not be as interested
in holding shares in a private company and, therefore, desire liquidity. Because a public offering
is one way to obtain liquidity, the factors we examined may help family firms focus on what
matters and contribute to more successful IPOs
for these generally closely held firms.
The results of this study have additional implications for family-controlled firms. First, planning and operational changes should be executed
well in advance of a liquidity event to maximize
value. The results also suggest that family firms
should hire professional managers where needed.
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Such a move might require outside consultants
to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the incumbent managers. Likewise, family-controlled
firms may want to offer stock-based incentives
to increase shareholdings after the IPO and to
retain top-quality management. Advanced planning and execution also increases the value of the
company for the insiders by increasing the odds
that the firm will be able and ready to take advantage of opportunities in the capital markets.
In other words, proactive planning and execution is like having an additional put option available to the management. Opportunities in the
financial markets can be fleeting and require
preparation to realize, as the experiences of 1999
to 2000 show.
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